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1. Introduction 
Any kind of socially progressive critique of social practices must accom-
plish the difficult task of taking up a stance that is both appropriately crit-
ical of, and sympathetic to, the self-understanding of those whom it ad-
dresses. In doing so, it must avoid two mistakes: on the one hand, it must 
take into account that many of the negative features of our societies, such 
as racism and sexism, are not only rooted in what people do, but also per-
vade the very conceptual categories in which we understand ourselves. 
Thus, any serious critique of our social world has to seemingly reject 
many aspects of this socially dominant self-understanding. It seems neces-
sary to do so in order to avoid falling into the trap of unconsciously re-
producing relationships of oppression or subordination by formulating 
one's criticism in a language that already buys into a problematic concep-
tual framework. On the other hand, it is a futile enterprise to try to com-
pletely reject and replace the categories of the self-understanding of those 
whom one addresses. This is not only because it is hardly possible for crit-
ics to step completely outside of the language and the ways of thinking 
which are prevalent in their society. If they attempt to do so, critical theo-
rists might also become unable, firstly, to correctly identify the subjective 
experiences of oppression to which critical theories must necessarily refer; 
secondly, they risk becoming unable to formulate normative principles to 
which those whom they address could reasonably agree; and, thirdly, they 
become less capable of understanding the social struggles of their times. In 
other words, if social critics do not aim at an understanding of social prac-
tices from the ‘inside’ (that is, as understood from within those frame-
works of thought and action that they aim to criticize), their critique be-
comes too disconnected to be valuable. 
Even though one might entertain the thought, for example, that it would 
be better if we all just rejected the idea of ‘race’ and treat the concept of 
‘race’ as having no meaning at all, it quickly becomes clear that not only 
would this ignore the fact that categories of ‘race’ are real for all of us, but 
that for many members of our societies the fact that they belong to one 
race and not to another is encountered each day as a brute fact. The expe-
rience of belonging to a ‘race’ cannot be understood without reference to 
the reality which ‘race’ actually has in our societies, understood in terms 
of the meaning of the relevant discursive ascriptions. 
Critical theorists have traditionally employed a methodological solution 
to this dilemma, namely, the method of ‘immanent critique’. As a meth-
od, immanent critique begins from the self-understanding of a given soci-
ety and critically evaluates this self-understanding on its own terms in 
order to emphasize the ways in which it fails to successfully structure the 
practice of that society and to point out the pathologies that it necessarily 
produces. If one of the tasks of critical theories is to make this burden of a 
self-understanding being deficient according to its very own standards 
‘still more oppressive by adding to it a consciousness of it, and the shame 
[…] more shameful by making it public’, as Marx (1972, 134) famously ar-
gued, they might be capable of breaking the spell of ideological self-
understandings without resorting to an ‘external standpoint’. 
While many social theorists engaged in progressive politics would agree to 
this description, the enormously difficult task of articulating this idea in 
the terms of our most advanced philosophical theories of language, mind, 
and social reality has rarely been attempted. It is the great achievement of 
Sally Haslanger's essays in Resisting Reality that she offers exciting new 
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answers on how to think about these problems. This especially concerns 
her analysis of the role of race and gender concepts, an analysis that nei-
ther rejects them in favour of some idealized notion of how we better 
should think or speak, nor accepts them as a mere given to which we have 
to adapt. 
There are two points in Resisting Reality in which both the advantages 
and the challenges of this strategy become explicit. The first point con-
cerns the treatment of the categories of race and gender (categories for 
which the problem that I have just described is especially salient). The 
second point concerns the notion of ‘ideology’. I would like to argue that 
in both cases Haslanger's treatment of the issue goes beyond traditional 
approaches and establishes extremely interesting results. However, I 
would also like to examine both cases to see whether her approach in-
volves a certain residual individualism that makes some of her arguments 
less powerful than they could otherwise be.  
 
2. Semantic Externalism and Social Kinds 
One of the most fundamental claims of Resisting Reality concerns a com-
bination of realism and constructionism in regard to gender and race. 
Haslanger argues that concepts such as ‘woman’ or ‘black’ describe some-
thing real (as opposed to a mere illusion), but what they describe are not 
(as some people often think) essential or even natural properties of indi-
viduals, but rather social kinds. In particular, such terms describe the 
membership of people in groups that occupy certain positions in social 
hierarchies of domination (Haslanger 2012, 229-235).1 With this claim, 
Haslanger not only rejects naturalist theories of race and gender, but also 
eliminativist theories that hold that race and gender terms do not refer to 
anything at all (cf. 299 ff.). 
This theory rests on a certain picture about the meaning of concepts. Of 
course, Haslanger acknowledges that the intuitions that typical language 
users have about the meanings of race and gender terms do not necessari-
ly go along with an explicit understanding that they refer to social kinds. 
In fact, many people who talk about race and gender believe the corre-
sponding terms to refer to natural kinds. However, drawing on externalist 
theories of meaning, Haslanger argues that an introspective analysis of 
concepts (that is, an analysis that refers to the understanding of ordinary 
language users) is inadequate to determine their content (379, 398). In-
stead, she endorses a variety of semantic externalism, that is, a view about 
concepts that holds that what determines their extension – and also, at 
least in part, their meaning – is what these concepts really ‘track’. 
We can therefore distinguish between two aspects of a concept: the mani-
fest and the operative concept (92, 370). The manifest concept is deter-
mined by the meaning that language users understand a term to have. In 
contrast, the operative concept is determined by the properties or entities 
that are actually tracked by the linguistic practice in which such terms are 
employed. 
As is obvious in the case of race and gender categories, there can be a mis-
match between manifest and operative concepts. For instance, many peo-
ple believe that these terms track essential, intrinsic properties of individ-
uals that serve to explain their behaviour, whereas closer inspection 
reveals that there are, in fact, no such intrinsic properties. Rather, the way 
we employ categories of race and gender in our ‘everyday theories’ sug-
gests that these concepts reliably track positions of social status due to 
which certain groups of people, as categorized by certain physical ‘mark-
ers’, are systematically treated differently. 
This mismatch between operative and manifest concepts in our everyday 
use has direct implications for the question of critique: given this distinc-
tion, we can attempt to provide an immanent critique of our linguistic 
practices. This is because we are in principle capable of finding out (and 
convincing others) that our concepts of race and gender are not ade-
quately understood using an essentialist theory of these phenomena. 
Such an immanent approach that points out a problem of a social practice 
(in this case, of the practice of categorizing persons according to gender) 
‘from within’ is preferable to a critique ‘from the outside’ which only 
takes up the manifest concept and subjects it to a ‘detached’ metaphysical 
scrutiny. In this case, such an ‘external’ critique could only discover that 
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nothing in the real world is captured by the manifest, essentialist concept 
of race (because there are no racial essences that play any role in the best 
explanation of the behaviour of individuals). Consequently, an external 
critique of our ‘race’ vocabulary could only argue for discarding this vo-
cabulary and replacing it with another. But such a critique not only fore-
closes the possibility of investigating the possible rationale of some of our 
discursive practices in which we employ this vocabulary, it also does not 
tell us anything about the best understanding of the experiences of those 
persons who are members of the respective social kinds. 
This way of spelling out an ‘immanent’ strategy relies on a distinction be-
tween the semantic self-understanding of people and the actual social 
kinds that their concepts track that is often presented as relatively clean- 
cut. Even if Haslanger acknowledges that there can be multiple, compet-
ing concepts on both the operative and the manifest level (see 370, n. 5), 
she seems to clearly distinguish two possible types of social critique: first, a 
critique of concepts that shows that some concepts which many people 
take to refer to natural kinds actually refer to social kinds, and second, a 
critique of society that aims to change what social kinds there are. While 
the first type of critique might be a precondition for the second (we must 
know, for example, that ‘woman’ refers to a social kind in order to be able 
to intend to change society so that women, understood in terms of social 
status positions, no longer exist), these activities seem relatively independ-
ent from one another. 
To see why this might be a problematic way to put it, it is useful to exam-
ine in more detail how different kinds of semantic ‘externalism’ concep-
tualize the ‘external’. Haslanger introduces semantic externalism in two 
of its forms: first, there is the ‘natural kind’ variety which describes the 
view that the meaning of natural kind terms is partly constituted by the 
‘external’ instances of that kind that are responsible for our use of that 
concept.2 Second, there is a ‘social variety’, that is, the view that the mean-
ing of some of our concepts is constituted by the linguistic usage of our 
community.3 After referring to these two classical models, Haslanger in-
troduces her own account that she calls ‘objective type externalism’. 
 
According to objective type externalism: 
‘Terms or concepts pick out an objective type, whether or not we can 
state conditions for membership in the type, by virtue of the fact that 
their meaning is determined by ostension of paradigms (or other means of 
reference fixing) together with an implicit extension to things of the same 
type as the paradigms.’ (374) 
 
It is clear that this is an extension of natural kind externalism to social 
kinds. In other words, it takes the objective type which is tracked by the 
concept to be central for its meaning. Of course, in contrast to traditional 
natural kind externalism, this account also allows for the possibility that 
the objective type in question is a social kind. Compared with social ex-
ternalist approaches (which also apply to more than natural kind terms), 
however, the communal use of a term does not play any discernible role 
for its meaning on this account. 
My main worry regarding this move towards a specific kind of externalism 
is not one about its independent plausibility as a position within the phi-
losophy of language. In other words, I am not so much concerned with 
the success of ‘objective kind externalism’ as a theory of meaning, but ra-
ther with the consequences of choosing one such theory for a critique of 
concepts. 
As a starting point, we could interpret Haslanger's treatment of the mat-
ter as entailing that our individual understanding of linguistic terms, as 
captured by the ‘manifest concept’, is fully independent from our social 
conventions which are constitutive for the social kinds that these terms 
track, that is, as an ‘individualist’ variant of objective social kind external-
ism. Such an interpretation could emphasize some useful features of ob-
jective kind externalism for her critical project that aims to uncover how 
individuals’ understanding of the meaning of their concepts can mislead 
them. That is, the resulting account of meaning would support a type of 
philosophical critique that uncovers the ways in which beliefs of individu-
als about the proper use of race and gender terms only make sense by re-
lying on assumptions which do not withstand philosophical reflection. 
But sharply dividing the semantic self-understanding of individuals (as the 
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basis of the manifest concept) from social reality (as constitutive for the 
social kinds which determine the operative concept) also runs the risk of 
concealing more ‘material’ aspects of the discourses in which these con-
cepts are used. 
This point might best be illustrated by looking at another theory of con-
ceptual content: Robert Brandom's inferentialism. Even though Bran-
dom's peculiar mixture of externalist and semantic holism leaves many 
questions unanswered, it is clear that it goes along with the externalist 
intuition insofar as the meaning of concepts is not taken by him to be de-
termined by the ‘internal’ self-understanding (or the mental states) of a 
concept user. Rather, on Brandom's account, it is the pattern of socially 
licensed inferences between propositions involving certain concepts that 
determine their meaning (e.g. the fact that one can legitimately infer ‘Fido 
is an animal’ from ‘Fido is a dog’ determines part of the meaning of ‘dog’). 
That inferences are socially approved of, however, is a matter of the im-
plicit social rules of a linguistic practice as instituted in the entirety of a 
community's reactive dispositions (see Brandom 1994, chs. 1 and 2). 
If we look from the perspective of this kind of externalist theory to the 
issue of the ‘real’ meaning of ‘our’ race and gender terms, we might say 
that the social conventions that regulate the use of such terms are essen-
tialist insofar as they often support, for example, inferences from the as-
cription of racial or gender identities to ascriptions of intrinsic properties 
of certain kinds. In other words, our social conventions governing the 
socially shared linguistic use of race and gender concepts might only 
make sense on a metaphysically unacceptable essentialist interpretation of 
these terms. If we neither want to accept a naturalist analysis nor say that 
these concepts do not refer to anything at all, then it is very useful for a 
critical project to distinguish, once more, between the operative concepts 
at play, concepts that are determined by the objective social kinds that 
race and gender terms really track, and the manifest concepts which are 
determined by the implicit, practical, collective linguistic self-
understanding of a community. 
If we consequently locate ‘manifest’ concepts on the level of communal 
discursive practices (as would be completely consistent with Haslanger's 
theory),4 then it is plausible to say that both the manifest and the opera-
tive concepts are (at least somewhat) independent from any individual's 
self-understanding, and that both the existence of the manifest concept 
and the existence of the entities and properties tracked by the operative 
concepts are fully dependent on social practices. It then becomes possible 
to distinguish between manifest concepts on the individual and the social 
level. 
Especially in the case of race and gender terms, we can imagine that there 
are contexts in which some competent users of these concepts do not ex-
plicitly believe, even on a close inspection of their semantic intuitions, 
that these concepts denote essential, intrinsic properties of people. For 
example, we might imagine that there are philosophers in some university 
who – as a matter of explicit belief – do not think that women or mem-
bers of racialized groups are intrinsically less capable at doing academic 
work than men or ‘white’ people. Nevertheless, the very same individuals 
may still – without any sense of alienation – participate in a discursive 
practice in which inferences from ascriptions of race and gender to ascrip-
tions of intrinsic philosophical abilities are regularly counted as valid and 
are treated as unproblematic. In a case like this, one could say that the in-
ferential norms governing the use of their gender concepts in their discur-
sive practice determine both their socially shared manifest concepts and 
their operative concepts, despite their explicit semantic beliefs. 
Such a mismatch between the explicit self-understanding of individuals 
and their collective self-understanding as instituted in a social practice 
seems possible because discursive practices are constituted by more than 
just the individual semantic intuitions or the beliefs of their members. 
Socially shared inferential norms do not normally only reflect a sum of 
contingent individual mental states or dispositions, they also usually ex-
press practical distinctions that have belief-independent support in legal 
rules, conventional procedures, institutions, and material arrangements.5 
If one acknowledges, however, that both the socially shared manifest and 
the operative concepts of a community are a matter of social practices 
which are not exhausted by discursive interaction in a very narrow sense 
but are highly interdependent with legal rules, organizational rules of 
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formal and informal work, with markets, city layouts and all other kinds 
of material arrangements, a narrow distinction between critical interven-
tions that aim at a better self-understanding and political interventions 
that change the institutional and social structure becomes problematic. If 
we examine language as one component of social practices amongst oth-
ers, a ‘merely semantic’ critique of race and gender naturalism that aims 
at an improvement of the self-understanding that a group has of its own 
conceptual schemas - that is, a critique that attempts to change the beliefs 
of group members about the meaning of concepts such that these beliefs 
better track the real meaning of these concepts - becomes a problematic 
idea if one separates this activity too much from social critique in a broad-
er sense. 
For example, if as a result of being convinced by a critique of gender natu-
ralism someone only changes their individual understanding of the corre-
sponding terms without ceasing to participate in the relevant discursive 
practice, then they would necessarily begin to use these terms inadequate-
ly according to the rules of this very practice. That is, a belief of theirs to 
the effect that they have now grasped the ‘real’ meaning of these concepts 
turns out to be false, at least in one sense: what they now take to be the 
correct rule of application for these concepts (especially in regard to infer-
ences) is apt to generate failures of communication with their fellow lan-
guage users. Thus, they must acknowledge that the critic has brought 
them to change their use of the concept rather than to better understand 
the collectively shared use.  
This line of thought not only supports the conclusion that an immanent 
critique of race and gender that only aims at convincing people to indi-
vidually revise their semantic self-understanding might miss its aim as 
long as it does not also aim at changing collective social practices that are 
both material and discursive. It also becomes clear, more importantly, 
that the ‘real social kind’ which our race and gender terms track is not 
metaphysically independent from the social practices that determine the 
socially shared manifest meaning of the relevant concepts. Rather, when-
ever we aim at revising our semantic self-understanding so that it better 
conforms to what race and gender ‘really are’, the very same process of 
revision might change exactly that, namely, what race and gender really 
are. To put it more concretely, it might turn out that a society where it is 
collectively acknowledged, as a matter of inferential discursive practice, 
that ‘our’ concepts of race and gender track social kinds constituted by 
certain structures of oppression, could very well be (in virtue of the revi-
sions to the whole web of practices that such a change would necessarily 
entail) a society in which these structures of oppression no longer exist in 
their present form. 
To pursue this line of thought just one step further: if we acknowledge 
that certain social kinds (such as race and gender) can perhaps only exist 
in societies in which the inferential practices embody a collective illusion 
about the meaning of the terms by which these kinds are tracked, the goal 
of revising our semantic intuitions such that manifest and operative con-
cepts become congruent does not make sense any more. Rather, what we 
then should ask is how our practices must change in order for there to be 
no longer any necessity for incongruence. This, of course, is a point that  
– in different ways – has been made both by Hegel and Marx. With his idea 
that there is a ‘life of the notion’, that is, a movement of continual con-
ceptual revision that might never come to an end, Hegel has expressed the 
intuition that, at the foundation of our conceptual practices, there might 
be a social process that is not guided by a goal of eventual ‘correspond-
ence’ between concepts and reality but rather by the goal of pursuing so-
lutions to the specific problems of each stage in that process (see Hegel 
1997, 27 f.). Against the potentially conservative implications of that theo-
ry, Marx (1940) has pointed out that it might be part of that very process 
that certain concepts of the social are ‘necessarily misleading’ inasmuch as 
their deceptive nature is rooted in the very social practices they seemingly 
enable us to understand. A further examination of these lines of inquiry 
might lead us away from questions of metaphysics towards a more socio-
logical inquiry concerning the internal dynamics of social practices and 
historical changes, an inquiry that no longer relies as much on the criteri-
on of whether our concepts correctly grasp objective kinds and focuses 
more on standards of progress that are internal to social practices. 
 
 
9 
Krisis 
   Journal for contemporary philosophy                                                       Titus Stahl – Criticizing Social Reality from Within 
3. The Critique of Ideology 
The search for an immanent form of critique is, as I understand it, also at 
the core of Haslanger's notion of ideology critique. As the term is used 
throughout Resisting Reality, ‘ideology’ does not only include explicit 
beliefs, but also background assumptions, habits of thought and percep-
tion (18, 448) and socially shared schemas (413-418). These elements all 
form a background for the application of concepts (413). Ideology critique 
is thus thought to disrupt a dogmatic application of concepts (17), that is, 
an application of concepts that is insufficiently understood and insuffi-
ciently responsive towards considerations about what the point of using 
these concepts should be. 
Haslanger argues that we should understand statements that employ ide-
ologically-laden terms not as straightforwardly false, but as true in rela-
tion to certain contexts of assessment (419-421). In other words, ideologi-
cal concepts (such as ‘cool’ or ‘cute’, in Haslanger's examples), if they are 
understood as relative to a social context of assessment, can be employed 
correctly without ideology critique becoming inappropriate – for such 
critique does not primarily rest on the assumption that the application of 
these concepts is false, but rather that these concepts (and consequently, 
the social contexts of assessment) are in some way defective. For this rea-
son, ideology critique need not endorse the relativist implications that 
seem to follow from the idea of contextual truth. Ideology critique as a 
practice, Haslanger argues, must rather aim at finding a common ground 
of assessment from which a rejection of ideological judgements can be 
shown to be justified (425). Of course, such common ground cannot al-
ways be assumed to exist. Rather, ideology critique must often try to 
change or resist certain forms of de facto common grounds. 
Even though Haslanger resists any temptation to enter into debates about 
normative justification, aspiring instead to ‘only’ elucidate the social reali-
ty that such debates are about, the notion of ideology is one in regard to 
which it becomes problematic to refrain from taking up a position on 
normative principles: for the question naturally arises as to how partici-
pants could ever be justified in privileging one form of common ground 
over another. Haslanger suggests that there might be formal criteria for 
designating some forms of common ground as superior, for example, if 
they can be reached without coercion or violence (426). These formal cri-
teria are clearly useful, but it is not obvious that they capture everything 
that is wrong about ideologies, many of which precisely serve to support 
social structures of oppression without resort to violence. On an everyday 
understanding of ‘ideology’, ideologies are clearly in some sense deficient 
as representations of the world, but if they are, at the same time, true ac-
cording to some contexts of assessment we should also expect the ques-
tion as to which one of these contexts one should privilege to be answered 
in reference to certain normative and epistemic considerations. 
Although I can only voice an intuition here that is not yet entirely devel-
oped, I believe that this problem is, once more, connected to the question 
of what the ‘common’ in common ground means. An agreement about 
certain conversational implicatures or an agreement about the applicabil-
ity of certain concepts that constitute a common ground is, as Haslanger 
describes it, both a question of habit and socialization and a question of 
individually shared beliefs. What makes a ‘common’ ground into some-
thing that is shared can be understood, in regard to these aspects, as an 
agreement of individual dispositions or beliefs. 
However, there might be another aspect of what makes a common 
ground into something ‘common’, namely a normative understanding, 
not only in regard to which further discursive moves are justified given 
that common ground, but which also might include an agreement about 
how one can change that common ground.  
To use Haslanger's example: a conversational agreement about certain 
features of ethnic groups might be more or less problematic according to 
the degree the vocabulary of ‘race’ itself can be challenged within the fur-
ther development of the conversation. We can compare two cases here: in 
the first case, there is an understanding that racial ascriptions (or judge-
ments about ‘coolness’ or ‘cuteness’) might turn out to be false but that 
they can never turn out to be inapplicable. In the second case, however, 
while racial ascriptions are collectively accepted by all participants, they 
also (implicitly) accept the rule, that there are certain observations that 
would make it rational to drop this kind of ascription altogether from the 
10 
Krisis 
   Journal for contemporary philosophy                                                       Titus Stahl – Criticizing Social Reality from Within 
discursive repertoire. While the second case seems to be a case in which 
there are inappropriate or even misleading categories in play, it seems not 
such a clear-cut example of ideology as the first case. This is because, in 
the first case, there is a normative restriction built into a discursive situa-
tion which disallows certain ways of further developing the common 
ground which does not exist in the second case. Such a restriction on the 
ways in which a common ground can be changed (a restriction which is 
especially obvious in the case of the ideologies of race and gender natural-
ism) is a normative feature of the discursive situation which – while it 
might be supported by habits or beliefs – requires more than a mere 
agreement in content between the respective interlocutors’ independent-
ly existing beliefs or dispositions. This normative feature rather belongs to 
the institutional aspects of a speech situation, or rather, of the normative 
social practice into which the ‘common ground’ is embedded. 
If we acknowledge this normative aspect of ideological ‘common 
grounds’, we might formulate an immanent critique of the degree to 
which the institutional or normative rules of conventional speech situa-
tions limit the development of conceptual alternatives from ‘within’. This 
might turn out to be a criterion to distinguish ideological from non-
ideological ‘common grounds’ that allows for degrees, and that combines 
normative and epistemic considerations in just the right way (see also 
Stahl 2013). Of course, as soon as we understand this to be not only a mat-
ter of individual dispositions and beliefs but also of material practices and 
forces, the ‘common ground’ might turn out to have a richer material 
and historic dimension than those which become accessible if one only 
focuses on speech-act theoretic considerations alone. 
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mined at least in part by the standard linguistic usage in his or her community.’ (374) 
 
4 In her discussion of the ‘improvisation theory of meaning’ (437-439), Haslanger also 
requires a ‘coordinating intention’ of language users in respect to the usage in their 
community as well as a ‘shared tradition’, but this still allows for the question of whether 
that which makes up these shared elements is, in any way, independent from individual 
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5 Carefully distinguishing between individual and shared manifest meanings might also 
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